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The Association between Audit Quality and Abnormal Audit Fees 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a sample of 9,820 firm-year observations over the 2000-2003 period, this 
paper examines whether, and how, audit quality proxied by unsigned discretionary 
accruals is associated with the abnormal audit fee, i.e., the difference between actual 
audit fee and auditors’ expectation on the normal level of fee. The results of various 
regressions reveal that the association between the two is insignificant for the full 
sample, significantly positive for the subsample of clients with positive abnormal fees, 
and insignificantly negative for the subsample of clients with negative abnormal fees. 
The above results suggest that auditors’ incentives to compromise audit quality differ 
systematically depending on whether the clients pay more than or less than the normal 
level of audit fees, which in turn leads to the audit fee-audit quality association being 
conditioned on the sign of abnormal audit fees. Our results are robust to a battery of 
sensitivity checks. Relevant implications of our results to policy makers and academic 
researchers are discussed.   
 
Keywords: Audit quality, Audit and non-audit services, Abnormal audit fees, 
Earnings management  
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The Association between Audit Quality and Abnormal Audit Fees  
 
1. Introduction 
Using a large sample of 9,820 audit fee observations over the 2000-2003 period, 
this paper investigates whether, and how, audit quality is associated with an auditor’s 
fee dependence on a specific client. Similar to previous research (e.g., Frankel et al. 
2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004), 
we use the magnitude of discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. To capture 
the fee dependence or economic bonding, we use abnormal audit fees which are   
defined as the difference between actual audit fees and the expected level of audit fees 
(i.e., normal audit fees). We are motivated to focus our analysis on the association of 
unsigned discretionary accruals with fees paid to auditors for their financial statement 
audits (i.e., audit fees) rather than with fees paid to auditors for non-audit services (i.e., 
non-audit fees) for the following reasons.  
First, most previous studies on the association between audit quality and auditor 
fees focus their attention on the effect of non-audit service (NAS) fees on auditors’ 
incentives to compromise audit quality.1 As a result, they pay relatively little attention 
to the effect of audit fees on audit quality. As will be further explained in the next 
section, however, excessively high audit fees can create similar incentives for auditors 
to compromise audit quality in their reporting decisions with respect to a specific client. 
Moreover, even if auditors are not allowed to provide certain NAS to the same client as 
required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, audit quality could still be impaired 
                                                
1
 Since the Enron debacle and the subsequent collapse of Andersen, many studies have focused on the 
issue of whether the provision of non-audit services (NAS) by the incumbent auditor to the same client 
impairs auditor independence, and thus lowers audit quality, in the context of earnings management (e.g., 
Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004), 
restatements of previously issued financial statements (e.g., Kinney et al. 2004), the propensity of auditors 
issuing going concern opinions (e.g., Craswell et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 2002; Raghunandan et al. 2003), 
and news-dependent accounting conservatism (Ruddock et al. 2005).  
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when the level of audit fees is excessively high. Given the scarcity of empirical 
evidence on the issue, this paper aims to provide systematic evidence on whether 
(abnormal) audit fees are associated with the magnitude of earnings management 
measured by unsigned discretionary accruals.  
Second, previous studies which examine the association between unsigned 
discretionary accruals and audit fees provide at best mixed evidence on the effect of 
audit fees on earnings management. For example, Frankel et al. (2002) report that audit 
fees are negatively associated with unsigned discretionary accruals, suggesting that 
auditors are less likely to allow opportunistic earnings management by high-fee clients 
than by low-fee clients.2 Ashbaugh et al. (2003) report, however, that audit fees are 
insignificantly associated with their measures of abnormal accruals.3 Given these mixed 
results, we revisit the issue using an extended set of audit fee data and a different audit 
fee metric, namely abnormal audit fees.4  
Briefly, our regression results show the following. We find that unsigned 
discretionary accruals are insignificantly associated with abnormal audit fees as well as 
actual audit fees for the full sample. However, when we partition the full sample into 
the two subsamples, that is (1) the sample of clients with positive abnormal fees and (2) 
the sample of clients with negative abnormal fees, we find that abnormal audit fees are 
significantly positively associated with unsigned discretionary accruals for the positive 
abnormal fee sample, while the associations are insignificant with a negative sign for 
the negative abnormal fee sample. This asymmetry in the discretionary accruals-audit 
                                                
2
 See their Table 6. Frankel et al. use the percentile rank of audit fees and unsigned discretionary accruals 
as their metrics for audit fees and audit quality, respectively.  
3
 See their Table 4. Ashbaugh et al. use the signed level of performance-adjusted discretionary current 
accruals as a measure of audit quality. Their audit fee metric is the natural log of audit fee. 
4
 While Chung and Kallapur (2003) and Larcker and Richardson (2004) have examined the association of 
their measures of earnings management with non-audit fees and total fees (i.e., non-audit fees plus audit 
fees), they did not examine the effect of audit fees on earnings management directly. We will revisit this 
issue later. 
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fee association between the two distinct samples suggests that the structure of auditors’ 
incentives to compromise audit quality differs systematically for clients with positive 
abnormal audit fees vis-à-vis clients with negative abnormal fees. Further tests show 
that the significantly positive relation between discretionary accruals and abnormal 
audit fees for the positive abnormal fee sample is robust to whether discretionary 
accruals are income-increasing or income-decreasing and the use of alternative 
statistical methods and different samples.   
Finally, in contrast to our findings on the discretionary accruals-abnormal audit 
fee association, the results of our sensitivity tests using abnormal NAS fees or fee ratios 
(NAS fees / audit fees and NAS fees / total fees) reveal that the provision of NAS is not 
significantly associated with unsigned discretionary accruals. These findings are 
consistent with those reported in most previous studies. 
Our study provides useful insight into current regulatory debates on economic 
bonding of the auditor to the client or an auditor’s fee dependence on a client, and adds 
to the existing literature in the following ways.  If the association between unsigned 
discretionary accruals and abnormal fees is positive for a sample of clients with positive 
abnormal fees and it is insignificant or negative for a sample of clients with negative 
abnormal fees, examining the association for a combined sample of clients with both 
positive and negative abnormal fees most likely leads us to observe insignificant 
associations as reported in most previous studies (e.g., Antle et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 
2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Reynolds et al. 2004) as well as in our study. This is 
so because the two opposing effects may cancel out each other when the combined 
sample is used. The findings of this study suggest that future research on similar issues 
should take into account the fact that auditors’ incentives to compromise their audit 
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quality differ systematically, depending on whether or not fees paid to auditors are in 
excess of their expectation on the normal level of fees.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we develop our 
research hypotheses on the audit fee-audit quality association.  In section 3, we describe 
our empirical procedures. In section 4, we present our empirical results. In section 5, we 
present the results of further analyses on the association of unsigned discretionary 
accruals with non-audit fees and the ratio of non-audit fees to audit or total fees. The 
final section concludes the paper.   
 
2. Hypothesis Development  
2.1 Abnormal fees versus actual fees 
 Actual fees paid to auditors consist of two parts, that is: (1) normal fees that 
reflect auditors’ efforts costs and litigation risk; and (2) abnormal fees that are specific 
to contractual relationships between auditors and their clients. While normal fees are 
determined by factors that are common across different clients such as client size, client 
complexity, and client-specific risk, abnormal fees are determined by factors that are 
idiosyncratic to a specific client. As noted by Kinney and Libby (2002: p.109), 
abnormal fees “may more accurately be likened by attempted bribes” and capture the 
profitability of auditor-provided services. In particular, positive abnormal fees, namely 
actual fees in excess of normal fees, are likely to create economic bonding of the auditor 
to the client, while negative abnormal fees are unlikely to do so. Put differently, the 
structure of auditors’ incentives to compromise audit quality in relation to the fee level 
is likely to differ systematically, depending on whether abnormal fees are positive or 
negative.  
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However, most previous studies use the level of actual fees paid to auditors, with 
no reference to the above asymmetry, to proxy for auditors’ economic bonding to clients. 
In competitive markets for audit services, the fees paid to auditors reflect auditors’ 
effort costs and litigation risk (Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2005). Observed differences in 
the level of actual fees across clients are more likely to reflect differences in effort costs 
and client-specific risk across clients, and thus have a limitation in capturing the 
differences in the extent of auditors’ economic bonding across clients.  The use of actual 
fees as a proxy for auditors’ economic bonding to clients may thus cause non-trivial 
measurement errors unless cross-sectional differences in effort costs and litigation risk 
are appropriately controlled for. It is possible that the insignificant associations between 
audit quality and various fee metrics that previous research documents are driven by 
these measurement errors rather than the lack of the underlying relation. In addition, 
even though several prior studies use abnormal fee metrics as well as actual fee metrics, 
they perform analyses using the pooled (total) sample without separating the sample 
into two subsamples of clients with positive and negative abnormal fees. Thus, if the   
significant fee-quality relation exists only for one of the subsamples, then it is possible 
that one is unable to observe any significant association in the analyses with the pooled 
sample due to possible cancellation effect caused by the asymmetric fee-quality 
relations between the two subsamples. 
 
2.2 The association between abnormal fees and audit quality     
The objectivity and independence of auditors is more likely to be influenced by 
the level of client fees in excess of auditors’ expectation on normal fees, i.e., abnormal 
fees, rather than the expected, normal level of fees which primarily reflects auditors’ 
efforts costs and litigation risk. If an auditor receives unusually high audit fees from a 
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client (i.e., positive abnormal fees), this positive abnormal fees could make auditors 
financially dependent on their clients and thus create economic bonding of the auditor to 
the client.5 This is so because, for clients with positive abnormal fees, the benefits to the 
auditor from retaining these profitable clients may outweigh the costs associated with 
allowing substandard reporting (e.g., increased litigation risk, reputation loss, etc.).  
To the extent that the perceived net benefits are greater than the associated costs, 
the economic bonding will increase, and audit quality will decrease, with positive 
abnormal fees. We therefore predict a positive association between abnormal fees and 
unsigned discretionary accruals for clients with positive abnormal audit fees. Consistent 
with this prediction, Magee and Tseng (1990) and DeAngelo (1981a) argue that audit 
quality could be impaired when significant economic rents exist for the auditor’s 
engagement with a client. Similarly, while discussing Frankel et al.’s (2002) study, 
Kinney and Libby (2002) note that a strong economic bond between the auditor and the 
client will reduce the quality of reported earnings through auditors’ reduced willingness 
to resist client-induced biases in reported accounting information. Beck, Frecka and 
Solomon (1988) reports that economic bonding of an auditor to clients increases as the 
auditor receives higher fees from the clients and thus auditor independence is impaired. 
In particular, they argue that the observed longer auditor tenure occurs because auditors 
are less likely to resign from clients and/or clients are less likely to dismiss incumbent 
auditors. Dye (1991) also analytically shows that when clients overpay auditors to 
induce more favorable audit reports, auditors may impair the quality of audit services.  
                                                
5
 For example, Kinney and Libby (2002) explain that Enron’s actual audit fee in year 2000 was 250% of 
the estimated normal audit fee. Kinney and Libby (2002) suggest that abnormal fee is a very good 
measure to estimate the degree of economic bonding between auditor and client, compared with other 
measures used in prior literature. 
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To provide empirical evidence on the above prediction, we test the following 
hypothesis:    
H1: For clients with positive abnormal audit fees, the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals is positively associated with abnormal audit fees paid to 
incumbent auditors, other things being equal.   
On the other hand, when auditors are paid less than their expectations on the 
normal level of audit fees (i.e., abnormal audit fees are negative), they have few 
incentives to compromise audit quality by acquiescing to client pressure to allow 
substandard reporting. We therefore predict that the association between audit quality 
and (negative) abnormal audit fees is insignificant or at best weak for clients with 
negative abnormal audit fees. To test this prediction, we hypothesize:    
H2: For clients with negative abnormal audit fees, the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals is not significantly associated with abnormal audit 
fees paid to incumbent auditors, other things being equal.   
Although we predict the insignificant association, it is possible that the more 
negative are the abnormal fees, the lower are the incentives for auditors to compromise 
independence, and thus the lower is the magnitude of discretionary accruals. In such a 
case, one would observe a positive association between negative abnormal fees and the 
magnitude of earnings management (i.e., no asymmetric effects of positive and negative 
abnormal fees on audit quality). Alternatively, when auditors bear lower fees now in 
anticipation of higher fees from the future profitable engagements, auditors may be 
vulnerable to client pressure for allowing opportunistic earnings management, thus 
leading to a negative association between abnormal fees and the magnitude of earnings 
management for clients with negative abnormal fees.6 If none of these two effects exists 
                                                
6
 Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2003), among others, show evidence supporting auditors’ low-
balling behaviour, that is audit fee discounting in early periods of audit engagements. A common view in 
this literature is that auditors expect future fees to rise.  
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or the two effects cancel out each other on average, one may observe an insignificant 
association between negative abnormal fees and audit quality.  
 
3. Empirical Procedures 
In this section, we first specify an expectation model linking audit fees with their 
determinants which will be used for decomposing actual audit fees into normal 
(expected) and abnormal (unexpected) audit fees. We then describe how we measure 
our dependent variable, namely the magnitude of abnormal accruals. Finally, we specify 
our regression which links the magnitude of discretionary accruals with our test variable 
(i.e., abnormal audit fees) and other control variables, and explain how we test our two 
hypotheses, H1 and H2, in the context of our empirical model.     
 
3.1 Measurement of abnormal audit fees 
 To decompose actual audit fees into two components, namely the expected 
component which we call normal audit fees and the unexpected component which we 
call abnormal audit fees, we need to specify an expectation model linking actual fees 
with their determinants. Since Simunic (1980), the audit fee literature typically 
hypothesizes that audit fees are a positive function of three client-specific factors, 
namely client size, client complexity, and client-specific risk, and provides evidence 
consistent with this hypothesized relation (Chaney et al. 2004; Choi et al. 2005; 
Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2002; Francis and Stokes 1986; Frankel et al. 2002; 
Kim et al. 2005; and Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2003). Building upon the 
results of the above prior studies on audit fee determinants, we posit the following audit 
fee model:  
 10 
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where, for client firm j and in year t:  
AFEE = natural log of fees paid to auditors for their financial statement 
audits (i.e., audit fees) in thousand dollars  
 
LNTA = natural log of total assets in thousand dollars; 
 
NBS = natural log of one plus number of business segments; 
 
NGS = natural log of one plus number of geographic segments; 
 
INVREC  = inventory and receivables divided by total assets;  
 
EMPLOY = square root of the number of employees; 
 
ISSUE = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are 
more  than 5% of the total assets, 0 otherwise; 
 
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, 0 otherwise; 
 
EXORD = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses, 0 
otherwise; 
 
LOSS  = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
 
LEVE = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets); 
 
ROA  = return on assets (income before extraordinary items divided by 
average total assets); 
 
LIQUID = current assets divided by current liabilities; 
 
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is one of Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
 
BTM = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4. 
 
 In the above, all independent variables are measured as of the end of fiscal year 
unless otherwise noted. We include LNTA and EMPLOY to proxy for client size. The 
demand for audit services is likely to increase with firm size (LNTA and EMPLOY).  We 
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therefore expect that audit fees are positively associated with these variables. Audit fees 
are likely to be higher for clients with more complex business operations. We include 
the variables, NBS, NGS, INVREC, FOREIGN, and EXORD to proxy for client 
complexity. We expect that these variables representing client complexity are positively 
associated with audit fees. In short, all coefficients on the aforementioned variables are 
expected to be positive.  
 In Eq. (1), we include LOSS, LEVE, LIQUID and ROA to proxy for a client’s 
risk characteristics. Since auditors charge higher fees for risky clients (Simunic and 
Stein 1996), we predict that the coefficients on LOSS and LEVE are positive while those 
on ROA and LIQUID are negative. We include BIG4 to capture the effect of audit 
quality differentiation on audit fees. A positive coefficient on BIG4 means the existence 
of fee premiums for high-quality, prestigious auditors, namely Big 4 (previously 5, 6, or 
8). We include ISSUE and BTM to capture the effect of a client firm’s growth potential 
on audit fees. Growing firms are more often involved in external financing such as 
equity and bond offerings. The demand for both audit and non-audit services is greater 
for high-growth firms than low-growth firms (Choi and Wong 2006). In addition, firms 
involved in equity and debt offerings are in a greater need of audit services (Reynolds et 
al. 2004). We therefore expect a positive (negative) coefficient on ISSUE (BTM).   
 Using the estimated coefficients on the variables included in Eq. (1), we 
compute the predicted values of AFEE. We call the predicted values of AFEE ‘normal 
audit fees.’ We then measure abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE) by taking differences 
between AFEE and normal audit fees.7 
                                                
7
 Alternatively, we compute the dollar values of abnormal fees by taking differences between actual dollar 
values of audit fees and normal dollar values of audit fees after we convert the logged normal fees into 
their dollar values. Whether these dollar values of abnormal audit fees are deflated by actual audit fees or 
not, they are highly correlated with our original measures and yield almost identical empirical results. 
Thus, we do not separately report those results for brevity. 
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For our main analysis, we estimate Eq. (1) using a pooled sample of 9,820 firm-
years over the four-year period from 2000 to 2003. As will be further explained later, 
we also consider alternative methods for estimating Eq. (1) as part of our sensitivity 
checks: First, we estimate Eq. (1) for each year using annual observations after deleting 
the year dummies from Eq. (1). Second, we consider a percentage measure of abnormal 
fees (instead of the level measure), i.e., abnormal audit fees deflated by total fees, as the 
dependent variable. Finally, we also use an alternative fee metric which takes into 
account what Chung and Kallapur (2003) call client importance. In particular, we use, 
as the dependent variable, total fees paid to an auditor in a year divided by total revenue 
of the auditor in the same year, which is similar in spirit to fee metrics considered by 
DeAngelo (1981b), Chung and Kallapur (2003), and Larker and Richardson (2004). The 
results of these alternative estimations are discussed in details in Section 4. 
 
3.2 Measurements of discretionary accruals 
Like many other studies, we assume that discretionary or abnormal accruals 
(DA) are an outcome of opportunistic earnings management. In this paper, we consider 
two different measures of DA, that is: (1) discretionary total accruals using the 
augmented Jones (1991) model of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) which controls for the 
asymmetric timeliness of accruals in recognizing economic gain and loss; and (2) 
discretionary total accruals obtained by applying the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 1995) adjusted for firm performance (Kothari et al. 2005). We denote the first and 
second measures of DA by DA1 and DA2, respectively.  
To illustrate how we obtain the two measures of DA, consider the augmented 
Jones model of Ball and Shivakumar and the modified Jones model in Eqs. (2) and (3), 
respectively:  
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where, for firm j and in year t (or t - 1), ACCR denotes total accruals; A, REV, and PPE 
represent total assets, changes in net revenue, and gross property, plant and equipment, 
respectively; CFO represents cash flows from operations; DCFO is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise; 8 and  is an error term. 
Our first measure of DA, i.e., DA1, is computed as follows. Recent studies by 
Ball and Shivakumar show that accounting accruals recognize economic loss in a 
timelier manner than economic gain, and that accounting accruals are a piecewise linear 
function of current-period cash flows from operations. To incorporate this asymmetry 
between economic gain and loss into our accrual model, we include three additional 
variables, namely CFOjt/Ajt-1, DCFOjt, and (CFOjt/Ajt-1)*DCFOjt, in Eq. (2) in addition 
to the typical Jones-model variables, namely REVjt, RECjt and PPEjt.9  Using total 
accruals (ACCR) deflated by beginning total assets as the dependent variable, we 
estimate Eq. (2) for each two-digit SIC code industry and year.10  Our first measure of 
                                                
8
 Note here that DCFO serves as a proxy for economic loss; Similar to Ball and Shivarkumar (2006), we 
also consider alternative proxies for economic loss, i.e., the dummy variable which has the value of 1 for 
changes in cash flows (CFO) < 0, industry median-adjusted CFO <0, or excess annual return (annual 
return minus annual market return) <0; and 0 otherwise. Though not reported, the use of these alternative 
proxies for economic loss leads to similar results as those shown when we use DCFO as a proxy.     
9
 Ball and Shivakumar (2006) demonstrate that their nonlinear or piecewise linear models are “a substantial 
specification improvement, explaining up to three times the amount of variation in accruals as conventional 
linear specifications” such as Jones (1991) model. (p.3)    
10 As in other studies, total accruals (ACCR) is defined as earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations minus operating cash flows taken directly from the statement of cash (i.e., cash 
flow approach). Alternatively, when we measure the total accruals by balance sheet approach (the 
changes in non-cash current accruals minus changes in current liabilities net of changes in long-term debt 
included in current liabilities minus depreciation and amortization expenses), the (unreported) results are 
almost identical. 
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DA, namely DA1, is the difference between actual total accruals and the fitted values of 
Eq. (2).   
Our second measure of discretionary accruals, i.e., DA2, is computed as follows. 
For each two-digit SIC code industry and year, we estimate the modified Jones-model in 
Eq. (3), using cross-sectional observations. Residuals from Eq. (3) are our measure of 
DA before adjusting for firm performance. Kasznik (1999) and Kothari et al. (2005) 
point out that unadjusted DA is significantly influenced by a firm’s performance. To 
obtain performance-adjusted DA, we follow the performance-matching procedures used 
by Kothari et al. We match each firm-year observation with another from the same two-
digit SIC code and year with the closest return on assets in the current year. We then 
compute performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, namely DA2, by taking the 
difference between the original DA and the matched firm’s DA.11 
 
3.3 The model for examining the association between abnormal audit fee and   
earnings management 
To test our hypotheses, H1 and H2, we posit the following regression model 
linking the magnitude of our discretionary accrual measures with our test variable, 
namely abnormal audit fees (ABFEE), and other control variables:  
 
DA
 
=0 + 1 ABAFEE + 2 LNTA + 3 BIG4 + 4 BTM + 5 CHGSALE  
    + 6 LOSS + 7 LEVE + 8 ISSUE + 9 AUDCHG + 10 CFO                            (4) 
    + 11 LAGACCR  + industry and year dummies + error term                          
where, for each firm and in each year (the firm and year subscripts subsumed), |DA| 
denotes the absolute values of discretionary accruals; ABAFEE represents our measure 
                                                
11
 We repeat all the tests in this study with the performance-unadjusted discretionary accrual measure, but 
the (untabulated) results are qualitatively identical with the results using the performance-adjusted 
measure. The use of Kasznik’s (1999) method for adjusting for the firm performance does not alter our 
results.  
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of abnormal audit fees; CHGSALE denotes changes in sales deflated by lagged total 
assets; AUDCHG is the dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s auditor is in the first 
year of audit engagement and 0 otherwise; LAGACCR represents one-year lagged total 
accruals; and others are as defined earlier.  
In the above, the dependent variable, |DA|, is our proxy for the outcome of 
opportunistic earnings management. As mentioned earlier, we consider two alternative 
proxies, that is: (1) |DA1| which controls for the asymmetry in timeliness of accruals in 
recognizing economic gain and loss; and (2) |DA2| which is adjusted for firm 
performance.  
Previous research shows that large firms tend to have more stable and 
predictable operations and hence report a lower level of discretionary accruals than 
small firms (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002). In Eq. (4), we include LNTA to control for 
this size effect. Previous research indicates that Big 4 auditors are effective in 
constraining managers’ abilities to manage reported earnings through discretionary 
accrual choices (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999). Fan and Wong (2004) also 
document that in East Asian economies, Big 4 auditors are more effective in mitigating 
agency problems than non-Big 4 auditors. To control for the effect of this audit quality 
differentiation on our results, we include the dummy variable, BIG4. We include the 
variables, BTM and CHGSALE to isolate potential effects of firm growth on earnings 
management from the effect of abnormal audit fees. We include the loss dummy (LOSS) 
to control for potential differences in earnings management behaviors between loss and 
profit firms. Firms with high leverage may have incentives to boost reported earnings 
due to their concerns over debt covenant or private lending agreement violations 
(Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). We therefore include LEVE to 
control for this leverage effect. Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Kim et al. (2003),  and Chung 
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and Kallapur (2003), among others, find that firms that are involved in financing 
transactions tend to engage in opportunistic earnings more aggressively than those that 
are not. We include the ISSUE dummy to control for the effect of a firm’s involvement 
in financing transactions on our results. Previous research reports that newly hired 
auditors are not effective in their early years of audit engagements (Becker et al. 1998: 
Kim et al. 2003). We include the AUDCHG variable to control for this auditor change 
effect.   
Previous research provides evidence indicating that estimated discretionary 
accruals are positively correlated with firm performance as firms with low (high) cash 
flows tend to have negative (positive) discretionary accruals (Butler et al. 2004; Kasznik 
1999; Kothari et al. 2005). It is therefore important to control for the effect of firm 
performance on accruals when measuring discretionary accruals using the Jones (1991) 
model or its variants. To address this potential problem, we include CFO in Eq. (4).  As 
in Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Kim et al. (2003) and Chung and Kallapur (2003), we include 
lagged total accruals (LAGACCR) to control for variations in the reversal of accruals 
over time. Finally, we include industry and year dummies to control for possible 
variations in accounting standards and regulations across industries and over years. 12, 13 
We first estimate Eq. (4) using a full sample of 9,820 firm-year observations 
over the four-year period, 2000-2003.14 We then partition the full sample into two sub-
samples based on the sign of abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE), namely (1) the sample 
                                                
12
 Industry dummies are estimated following Frankel et al. (2002). We also estimate Eq. (5) without 
industry and year dummies, and obtained the results similar to those reported in the paper. 
13
 We also add total non-audit fee or abnormal non-audit fee as an additional control variable in Eq. (4) 
since the non-audit fee could also influence the discretionary accruals as well as audit fee simultaneously. 
However, the empirical results are qualitatively similar. We therefore do not separately report the results 
for brevity. 
14
 When we perform a year-by-year estimation of abnormal audit fees using Eq. (1), we also perform 
year-by-year analyses with Eq. (4). The results are discussed later. 
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with positive abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE > 0); and (2) the sample with negative 
abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE < 0). To test hypotheses, H1 and H2, we estimate Eq. (4) 
separately for the sample with positive abnormal fees and for the sample with negative 
abnormal fees. A positive coefficient on ABAFEE for the sample with positive abnormal 
fees is consistent with H1, while an insignificant coefficient on ABAFEE for the sample 
with negative abnormal fees is consistent with H2.     
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1.  Sample and data sources 
We obtain audit (and non-audit) fee data from the 2004 Compustat audit fees 
file. We retrieve all other financial data from the 2004 Compustat Industrial annual file. 
After we retrieve information on auditor identity and auditor changes from the 
Compustat, we verify its accuracy by referring to the information recorded in actual 
10K and 8K reports. We find several errors in the Compustat information and correct 
them based on the information recorded in 10K and 8K. The sample period for this 
study is restricted to the four-year period from 2000 to 2003 because the Compustat 
includes audit and non-audit fee data starting from 2000,15 and the current version of the 
Compustat file includes the data only up to fiscal year 2003. We exclude 2,081 firm-
year observations for financial institutions and utilities with their SIC codes being 6000-
6999 and 4900-4999, respectively. The final list of our samples, which have all the data 
required for our analysis, consist of 9,820 firm-years over the four-year sample period 
(1,643, 2,882, 3004, and 2291 for fiscal year 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively). 
 
                                                
15
 The SEC’s Final Rule S7-13-00 (Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements) 
requires registrants to disclose information about fees paid to the auditor in proxy statements filed on and 
after February 5, 2001.   
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4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study, except 
for abnormal audit fees which will be explained later. With respect to the results 
presented in Table 1, the following are noteworthy: First, the average of the unsigned 
level of discretionary accruals for our sample firms is 12.23% and 16.30% of lagged 
total assets when DA1 and DA2 are used, respectively. 16  These mean values are 
significantly larger than median values of 5.38% and 8.72%, respectively, suggesting 
that the DA-distributions are skewed. Second, the AFEE variable, which is the natural 
log of audit fees in thousand dollars, and the LNTA variable are reasonably distributed. 
Third, on average, 42.69% of our sample firms are involved in substantial financial 
transactions during the last three-year period, while 45.49% of them pay income taxes 
for the business operation in non-US tax jurisdictions. Fourth, on average, 44.13% of 
our samples experience a loss in current fiscal year, and 86.46% of them have their 
financial statements audited by one of Big 4 auditors. Finally, the distributional 
properties of other variables are, overall, comparable with those reported in other related 
studies (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE!] 
 
4.3. Estimation of the audit fee model 
Table 2 report the regression results for our audit fee model. Reported t-values 
are on an adjusted basis using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance 
matrix. As shown in the table, the explanatory power of the model is about 80%, 
suggesting that our audit fee determinants, taken as a whole, explain a significant 
                                                
16
 The greater value of DA2 than DA1 is consistent with Kothari et al.’s (2005) finding that performance-
adjusted DA values increase after the adjustment.  
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portion of the variations in audit fees.17 Moreover, all individual coefficients on our fee 
determinants included in Eq. (1) are highly significant with predicted signs.18 In short, 
the regression results in Table 2 strongly suggest that the estimated parameters of our 
audit-fee model can be used reliably for estimating normal audit fees.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE!] 
Using the estimated coefficients of our audit fee model in Table 2, we compute 
the predicted values of audit fees which are viewed as normal audit fees in this paper. 
We then obtain abnormal audit fee (ABAFEE) by taking the difference between AFEE 
and predicted, normal audit fees. Table 3 presents the distributional properties of 
ABAFEE for the full sample (N = 9,820), the subsample of clients with ABAFEE > 0 (N 
= 4,870), and for the subsample of clients with ABAFEE < 0 (N = 4,950).  
A close look into the distributional properties of abnormal audit fees indicates 
that our abnormal fee measure, i.e., residual values from Eq. (1), appears to be small. 
For example, it is -0.3225 and 0.3284 at the first and third quartile breaks, and the inter-
quartile range is 0.6509. However, when we convert the log value into the dollar value 
and the normal audit fee is set as its mean value of $277,078, the inter-quartile range 
becomes larger ($184,093).19  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE!] 
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 Our model provides a relatively higher explanatory power than the models used in prior studies. For 
comparison purpose, the explanatory powers in Ashbaugh et al.’s (2003) study is 60% for audit fee and 
72% for total fee model. In Larcker and Richardson’s (2004) study, that of total fee is 75%. Excluding 
year and industry dummies from Eq. (1) only slightly decrease the explanatory power to 77% and all the 
subsequent empirical results remain almost identical.   
18
 Though not tabulated, we also estimate Eq. (1) with the natural log of total fees (i.e., the sum of both 
audit and nonaudit fees) (TOTFEE) and the natural log of non-audit fees (NAFEE) as the dependent 
variables. The estimated coefficients using TOTFEE as the dependent variable are, overall, very similar to 
those of the audit fee model. This is not surprising, however, given that the Pearson correlation between 
audit fees and total fees is very high (0.9391). Similarly, the correlation between audit fees and non-audit 
fees is very high (0.7389). The use of NAFEE as the dependent variable produces similar results though 
the significance of estimated coefficients and the model’s explanatory power are lowered. The empirical 
results using non-audit fees are reported in Section 5. 
19
 If we use deflated value of abnormal fees, the abnormal fees are 71% (135%) of actual audit fees at the 
first (third) quartile break. 
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 We compare client characteristics between the sample with ABAFEE > 0 and the 
sample with ABAFEE < 0 to see if there exist any systematic differences between the 
two samples. Though not tabulated for brevity, we can report that firms with positive 
abnormal audit fees are slightly larger (in terms of LNTA) than the firms with negative 
abnormal fees (12.2958 vs. 12.1684, t=3.09). However, they are not significantly 
different in terms of ROA (-0.0961 vs. -0.0920, t=-0.52), LEVE (0.4844 vs. 0.4790, 
t=0.85), LOSS (0.4344 vs. 0.4482, t=-1.38), CFO (0.0079 vs. 0.0163, t=-1.31), and 
Zmijewski’s (1984) financial distress score (-1.7439 vs. –1.6779, t=-0.96). In 
conclusion, we find no systematic evidence that clients with positive abnormal fees 
differ systematically from those with negative abnormal fees in terms of their risk 
characteristics and operating performance.  
 
4.4. Pairwise correlation among research variables 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for our research variables that are 
included in Eq. (4). For our measures of discretionary accruals (i.e., |DA1| and |DA2|), 
they are highly correlated with each other ( = 0.5847), which suggest the robustness of 
the estimation methods. For ABAFEE, it is not significantly correlated to either |DA1| or 
|DA2|. In addition, all of the control variables in Eq. (4) are significantly related to both 
|DA1| and |DA2|, suggesting the need to control for their effects on our dependent 
variables in the multivariate analyses. For example, smaller firms, clients of non-Big 4 
auditors, firms with low book-to-market ratio, firms with high sales changes, loss-
making firms, highly levered firms, issuing firms, firms that change auditors, firms with 
low cash flows, and firms with low lagged total accruals are associated with a high level 
of unsigned discretionary accruals. 
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With respect to the structure of correlation among our explanatory variables, the 
following are noteworthy: First, firm size (LNTA) is significantly correlated with BIG4, 
LOSS, and CFO with  = 0.4314, -0.3290, and 0.3388, respectively, suggesting that 
large firms are more likely to hire one of Big 4 auditors and to have greater cash flows 
from operations, while they are less likely to incur a loss, compared with small firms. 
Finally, except for the above three correlation coefficients, the correlation coefficients 
for other pairs of variables are not high. Overall, the correlation statistics shown in 
Table 4 indicate that the results of our multivariate regressions are unlikely to suffer 
from multi-collinearity problems.20 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE!] 
 
4.5 Univariate Analysis 
 As shown in Table 4, for our full sample, abnormal audit fee metric (ABAFEE) 
is insignificantly associated with our measure of unsigned discretionary accruals (i.e., 
|DA1| and |DA2|). To further examine if this association differs systematically between 
clients with positive abnormal fees and clients with negative abnormal fees, we plot the 
mean and median |DA| against ABAFEE with |DA| in the vertical axis and ABAFEE in 
the horizontal axis, as illustrated in Figure 1. In so doing, we group the ABAFEE 
observations into 14 intervals which consist of 12 intervals with the same interval range 
of 0.15 from -0.9 to 0.9 and two additional intervals into which all observations with 
ABAFEE <-0.9 (leftmost side in Figure 1) and ABAFEE > 0.9 (rightmost side in Figure 
1) are assigned, respectively. We then compute the mean and median values of |DA| for 
observations belonging to each interval, and then plot the |DA| values against the mid- 
                                                
20
 In performing regression analyses, we also measure the VIF values to examine potential multi-
collineraity problems. But none of the VIF values are high enough to cause the problem. Thus, we do not 
separately report the values in the paper. 
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point of ABAFEE for each interval.21 Panel A (B) of Figure 1 reports the results when 
|DA1| (|DA2|) is used. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE!] 
 In both Panels A and B, the level of unsigned discretionary accruals increases as 
ABAFEE increases from zero. However, there is no clear trend when ABAFEE 
decreases from zero. Overall, both trends of the mean and median values reveal that the 
association is much stronger for clients with positive abnormal fees than for those with 
negative abnormal fees, a finding consistent with our hypotheses, H1 and H2. 
  
4.6. Results of multivariate regressions using the full sample 
We first estimate Eq. (4) using the full sample of 9,820 firm-year observations 
which include observations with both positive and negative abnormal fees over the 
sample period 2000-2003. Sections A and B of Table 5 report the regression results 
using |DA1| and |DA2|, respectively, as the dependent variable.  Throughout the paper, 
reported t-values are on an adjusted basis using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix. In each section, the first column presents the result of 
regression using abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE) as a measure of auditors’ economic 
bonding to clients while the second column reports the same using actual audit fees 
(AFEE). In the third column, we report the results using absolute value of abnormal 
audit fees, denoted by |ABAFEE|. Our full sample results in Table 5 are comparable 
with those reported in Frankel et al. (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) in the sense that 
in both studies, the associations between discretionary accruals and their audit fee 
metrics are examined for the full sample with no reference to the sign of abnormal fees.   
                                                
21
 We calculate the mean values after removing a few outliers with |DA| value greater than 1 to remove 
undue influence of the outliers. 
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As shown in Table 5, for our full sample, the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals is not significantly associated with both ABAFEE and AFEE.  The insignificant 
coefficients on AFEE, as reported in Column (2a) and (2b), are inconsistent with 
evidence reported in Frankel et al. (Ashbaugh et al.) who report a significant (weakly 
significant or insignificant) coefficient on their audit fee metrics with a negative sign.22 
However, the coefficient on |ABAFEE| is significantly positive in Column (3a) and (3b). 
We will further explore reasons why we observe a significant coefficient on |ABAFEE|, 
but not on ABFEE and AFEE, in Table 5.   
The coefficients on the control variables in Table 5 are, overall, in line with 
evidence reported in previous earnings management research. Consistent with our 
expectation, the coefficient on LNTA is significantly negative in all cases. The 
coefficient on BIG4 is significant with an expected negative sign at less than the 1% 
level, suggesting that Big 4 auditors are more effective than non-Big 4 auditors in 
constraining opportunistic earnings management. The coefficient on BTM is negatively 
significant in all cases. This is consistent with the notion that high-growth firms manage 
earnings more aggressively than low-growth firms. The coefficients on LOSS (LEVE) 
are marginally significant with negative sign (significantly positive) when |DA2| is used 
as the dependent variable, but insignificant when |DA1| is used. The coefficient on 
ISSUE is significantly positive when |DA1| is used as the dependent variable, but 
insignificant when |DA2| is used. The coefficient on CFO and LAGACCR are highly 
significant in all cases with an expected negative sign, which is consistent with evidence 
                                                
22
 If we use the 2000 data only following Frankel et al.’s and Ashbaugh et al.’s study, we find an 
insignificant negative coefficient on AFEE (-0.0924 with t = -1.57 when DA1 is used and -0.0137 with t = 
-0.71 when DA2 is used). This finding is similar to Ashbaugh et al.’s. Except for year 2000’s result, all 
the other years’ results show positive signs. These findings suggest that the negative coefficient 
documented in Frankel et al.’s and Ashbaugh et al.’s study might be an exceptional case occurred in year 
2000. 
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reported in previous research (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Becker et al. 1998; Kim et al. 
2003).  The coefficients on AUDCHG and CHGSALE are insignificant in all cases. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE!] 
 
4.7. Results of multivariate regressions using the partitioned samples 
Hypothesis H1 is concerned with the association between the magnitude of 
earnings management and abnormal audit fees for clients with positive abnormal audit 
fees while hypothesis H2 is concerned with the association for clients with negative 
abnormal audit fees. To test these hypotheses, we partition our full sample into two sub-
samples using the sign of abnormal audit fees: (1) the sample with ABAFEE > 0; and (2) 
the sample with ABAFEE < 0. 
Section A of Table 6 presents the regression results using |DA1| as the dependent 
variable, while Section B reports the same using |DA2| as the dependent variable. The 
first two columns of each section report the regression results when the full sample is 
partitioned into the two sub-samples using the sign of abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE).  
As shown in Columns (1a) and (2a) of Section A, when |DA1| is used as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on ABAFEE is significantly positive for the sample 
with ABAFEE > 0, which is consistent with our hypothesis H1, whereas it is 
insignificantly negative for the sample with ABAFEE < 0, which supports H2. The 
above results are in sharp contrast with the full sample results reported in Column (1a) 
of Table 5 where the coefficient on ABAFEE is insignificant for the full sample.  As 
shown in Columns (1b) and (2b) of Section B, the results using |DA2| as the dependent 
variable remain qualitatively identical with those using |DA1|.23, 24 
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 Alternatively, we use the following model which uses the absolute value of abnormal fees and 
performed the analyses with pooled sample rather than dividing the sample into subsamples with positive 
and negative abnormal fees.  
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To further examine whether the documented results are sensitive to the sign of 
discretionary accruals, we partition the sample of firms with ABAFEE > 0 into two 
groups, namely one with income-increasing accruals (DA+) and the other with income-
decreasing accruals (DA-), and then, re-estimate Eq. (4) for each group. Columns (3a) 
and (3b) report the regression results for the DA+ sample, while Columns (4a) and (4b) 
for the DA- sample. We find that the coefficient on ABAFEE is significantly positive for 
both DA+ and DA- samples, indicating that, for clients with positive abnormal fees, the 
magnitudes of both income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
increase as abnormal audit fees increase.25,26    
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE!] 
We now assess economic significance of the impact of abnormal audit fees on 
income-increasing discretionary accruals. For this purpose, consider the results for the 
sample with ABAFEE > 0 & |DA1+| as reported in Column (3a) of Table 6. When we 
change ABAFEE from 0 to 0.3315 (i.e., the median ABAFEE as reported in Table 3) and 
set all other variables at their respective mean values, the reported coefficient on 
ABAFEE of 0.0493 translates into an increase in positive DA1 by 1.63%. This increase 
is considered to be economically significant given that, for our full sample, the median 
                                                                                                                                          

DA 

= b0 + b1 

ABAFEE

+ b2

ABAFEE_NEG

+ b3 LNTA + b4 BIG4 + b5 BTM  
+ b6 CHGSALE + b7 LOSS + b8 LEVE + b9 ISSUE + b10 AUDCHG + b11 CFO + b12 LAGACCR   
+ industry and year dummies + error term  
In the model,

ABAFEE

is the absolute value of abnormal audit fees and 

ABAFEE_NEG

is the 
absolute value of abnormal audit fees if the abnormal fees are negative and zero otherwise. The results are 
consistent with those reported in Table 6 and thus not reported for brevity. 
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 We also perform all the analyses with only the clients of Big 4 auditors in order to avoid potential 
endogenous auditor choice by client firms (Choi and Wong 2006). Although not separately tabulated, the 
results using a sample of only Big 4 clients are qualitatively identical with those reported in the paper. 
25
 Though not reported, we also conduct the same analysis for the negative abnormal fee sample, and find 
that the coefficient on ABAFEE is insignificant for both the DA+ and DA- samples. 
26
 We also perform year-by-year analyses to check whether our reported results are driven by potential 
cross-correlation and/or auto-correlation of audit fees. We find, however, that the results remain  
qualitatively identical with those reported in Table 6. We revisit the issue in Section 4.3 as part of  
sensitivity checks. We also compute t-values by estimating clustered standard errors for each firm in the 
pooled analyses, but our statistical inferences remain unaltered.  
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DA1 is 5.3% of lagged total assets and the median ROA is 1.74% of total assets (as 
reported in Table 1). Consider the results for the sample with AFAFEE > 0 & |DA-| as 
reported in Column (4a) of Table 3. In this case, the reported coefficient on ABAFEE of 
0.0248 translates into economic significance of an increase in income-decreasing DA1 
by 0.33% (when we change ABAFEE from 0 to its median value and set all other 
variables at their respective mean values). The above findings suggest that economic 
significance of the ABAFEE effect on the magnitude of earnings management is greater 
for the sample of clients with positive discretionary accruals than for the sample of 
clients with negative discretionary accruals.    
The significantly positive (insignificantly negative) association between our two 
measures of earnings management (i.e., |DA1| and |DA2|) and abnormal audit fees for 
the sample of clients with positive (negative) abnormal fees supports our first (second) 
hypothesis, H1 (H2). This finding suggests that abnormal audit fees are associated with 
more aggressive earnings management only when the fees paid to auditor for their audit 
services are in excess of their expectation on normal audit fees. Or equivalently, our 
results indicate that abnormally high audit fees motivate auditors to compromise 
independence which impairs audit quality and thus financial reporting quality, whereas 
abnormally low audit fees do not.  
Overall, the findings in Table 6 suggest that the insignificant associations 
between various fee metrics and audit quality measures documented in most previous 
studies may be due to their failure to incorporate into analysis the asymmetry in the fee-
quality relation between the samples with positive and negative abnormal fees. Our 
results are consistent with the view that economic bonding of the auditor to a client does 
not arise when the auditor does not generate enough profits from the specific client, and 
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suggest that it is important for researchers to incorporate this asymmetry into their 
analyses when examining the fee-quality association.  
 
4.8. Sensitivity checks 
We perform a variety of sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of our 
findings. Because we find that the results using |DA1| are, overall, qualitatively similar 
to those using |DA2|, we explain only the results using |DA1| for brevity.  
First, we reestimate the regressions in Table 6 using a percentage measure of 
abnormal audit fees, i.e., the abnormal fees deflated by total audit fees. The use of this 
alternative measure does not alter our results reported in Table 6. For example, when 
|DA1| is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient on the deflated abnormal audit 
fee (say, DABAFEE) is 0.2793 (t = 3.38) and –0.0909 (t = -1.23), respectively, for the 
samples of clients with DABAFEE > 0 and DABAFEE < 0.  
Second, our sample period, 2000-2003, includes the year of the 2001 Enron 
debacle, and the subsequent Anderson collapse and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in 2002.27  In an attempt to control for potential effects of these time-specific factors 
on our regression results, we include year dummies in Eq. (4). To further check whether 
the results of our regressions reported in Table 6 are sensitive to time period, we 
estimate Eq. (4) for each sample year (without including year dummies), and find that 
the results remain unalterted: When ABAFEE is greater than zero, the yearly regressions 
reveal that the coefficient (t value) of ABAFEE is 0.0015 (0.03), 0.0527 (3.04), 0.0454 
(2.96), and 0.0446 (2.97) for years 2000, 2001, 20002, and 2003, respectively.28 These 
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 In October 2001, the SEC announced the investigation of Enron related party transactions. In December 
2001, Enron filed for the bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. In May 2002, Anderson trial on the 
obstruction of justice begins. In July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law.  
28
 The reported results use the abnormal audit fees measured by the residuals from the pooled regression 
reported in Table 2. We also perform year-by-year regression with Eq. (1), and measure abnormal audit 
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findings suggest that except for year 2000’s result, the results for the other three years 
are consistent with those reported in Table 6. 
Third, Figure 1 shows that there exists a large difference between mean and 
median values of discretionary accruals, suggesting the existence of outliers. To 
examine if our OLS results reported in Table 6 are driven by the outliers, we perform 
OLS analyses after removing observations with our measures of DA greater than one. In 
this case, the coefficient of ABAFEE is 0.0219 (t = 3.03) when ABAFEE is greater than 
0 and -0.0009 (t = -0.21) when ABAFEE is less than zero. Alternatively, we perform 
analyses after removing outliers of DA with the absolute value of standardized error 
greater than two or three, but the results remain qualitatively similar. Furthermore, 
without removing outliers, we perform median quantile regression (MQR) as well as 
robust regression (RR) which are less sensitive to the influence of the outliers. The 
coefficient of ABAFEE is 0.0084 (t = 2.41) and 0.0066 (t = 2.20) for MQR and RR, 
respectively, for the sample of clients with ABAFEE > 0, suggesting the robustness of 
our results with respective to the existence of outliers. 
Fourth, throughout the paper, our tests use observations pooled over the four-
year sample period, 2000-2003. As a result, the same firm’s observations are repeated 
over multiple years, which may cause residual auto-correlations. To address a concern 
over potential auto-correlation problems, we calculate a clustered standard error for 
each firm. We find that the results using the clustered standard error are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 6. For example, t value of model (1a) in Table 6 
decreases only slightly to 3.26 from 3.34 when the clustered standard error is used.  
                                                                                                                                          
fees for each year using the residuals from this year-by-year regression.  We then estimate Eq. (4) using 
this year-by-year abnormal audit fees as the test variable. We find that the results using this year-by-year 
estimates of abnormal audit fees are qualitatively identical. Not surprisingly, the year-by-year estimates of 
abnormal audit fees are highly correlated with the pooled estimates (the Pearson correlation = 0.9792 and 
the Spearman correlation = 0.9818).   
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Fifth, as shown in Columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 5, the associations between 
actual audit fees (AFEE) and our measures of unsigned discretionary accruals are 
insignificant for the full sample. We further examine whether this association is 
conditioned upon the level of audit fee and the sign of abnormal audit fee. For this 
purpose, we first bisect our full sample into two subsamples using the median audit fees 
of 5.48, namely: (1) the above-median audit fee sample (AFEE > 5.48); and (2) the 
below-median audit fee sample (AFEE < 5.48). We then estimate Eq. (4) for each 
subsample, after replacing ABAFEE by AFEE. The coefficient on AFEE is marginally 
significant with a positive sign (β1 = 0.0144; t = 1.82) for the above-median AFEE 
sample, but it is insignificant for the below-median AFEE sample. We also partition the 
full sample into two subsamples using the sign of abnormal audit fees, namely: (1) the 
positive abnormal fee sample (ABAFEE > 0); and (2) the negative abnormal fee sample 
(ABAFEE < 0). We then estimate Eq. (4) for each subsample, after replacing ABAFEE 
by AFEE. The coefficient on AFEE is significantly positive (β1 =0.0304; t = 2.87) for 
the positive ABAFEE sample, which is consistent with our hypothesis H1, while it is 
insignificantly negative for the negative ABAFEE sample, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis H2. These results suggest that abnormal audit fees, rather than the level of 
actual audit fees, drive our empirical findings. 
Finally, since discretionary accruals and audit fees are both influenced by 
decisions by managers (as well as auditors), an endogeneity issue may arise with respect 
to the association between discretionary accruals and abnormal audit fees. Abnormally 
high discretionary accruals of clients could cause their auditors to raise audit fees in a 
way to compensate for the higher litigation risk exposures associated therewith, whereas 
the high audit fees motivate auditors to allow opportunistic earnings management by 
clients. We find, however, that when we add |DA1| of current year as an additional 
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independent variable in the normal audit fee estimation model, i.e., Eq. (1), the variable 
is not significant. This insignificant result suggests that |DA1| is not priced by the 
auditors, which alleviates a concern over a possible reverse causation of greater 
earnings management leading to higher audit fees. The result of our Hausman test also 
indicates that the endogenity problem is not serious (F = 0.1573 and p = 0.6916). Even 
when we use a two-stage regression approach to estimate new measures of abnormal 
fees by including the predicted value of the endogenous variable, |DA1|, in the first-
stage regression, the results remain similar. 29  The second-stage regression of the 
predicted value of |DA1| on the predicted abnormal fees and all other control variables 
in Eq. (4) reveals that the coefficient on the predicted abnormal fees is insignificant for 
the full sample (-0.0056 with t = -1.01), significantly positive for the sample with 
predicted ABAFEE > 0 (0.0194 with t = 2.99), and insignificant for the sample with 
predicted ABAFEE < 0 (-0.0056 with t = -1.01). These results are all consistent with 
those reported in Tables 5 and 6, suggesting that the results reported in Tables 5 and 7 
are robust to potential endogeneity problems.  
 
4.9 Replication of Larker and Richardson’s (2004) study 
Unlike all the other studies that report an insignificant or marginally positive 
association between the extent of earnings management and audit (total or non-audit) 
fee, Larker and Richardson (2004: LR) report that earnings management decreases as 
auditors receive more fees in their pooled sample.  In addition, LR report that earnings 
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 Specifically, in the first stage, we model our endogenous variable, |DA1|, as a function of all the 
exogenous variables included in the system of equations, i.e., Eqs. (1) and (4) (a reduced form model). To 
obtain new estimates of abnormal audit fees, we include in Eq. (1) the predicted value of |DA1| obtained 
from the reduced form model. In this model, the instrumented endogenous variable will be uncorrelated 
with the error term, and coefficient estimates are unbiased and consistent. 
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management decreases with both positive and negative abnormal fees, which is 
contradictory to our findings.  
LR’s measure of total fee or non-audit fee is similar to that used by Chung and 
Kallapur (2003: CK) – what CK call a measure of ‘client importance’ to auditors. It is 
measured by the ratio of total fee (or non-audit fee) paid to an auditor to total revenue 
per year that the auditor receives. Although LR’s measure is similar to CK’s, LR’s 
finding is different from CK’s in that the latter reports an insignificant association 
between earnings management and their client importance measure. In contrast, when 
LR use the RATIO variable which is the similar to the FEERATIO variable used in our 
study (as in Table 8), their results show that there is a marginally positive association 
between the magnitude of earnings management and the ratio (as reported in Panel B of 
Table 5 in their study), which is consistent with the findings of our study and most prior 
studies. Thus, it seems that the difference between LR and our study (as well as CK) is 
likely to be driven by the use of different measures/methods used in the LR study.30  
To reconcile this difference, we replicate the LR study using our sample. In so 
doing, we measure TOTFEE and NONAUDFEE using the same method that LR use. 
The TOTFEE (NONAUDFEE) variable is the total fee (non-audit fee) that a client paid 
in a year divided by total revenue of the auditor in that year.31 Using these fee measures, 
we perform additional analyses. The findings are reported in Table 7. Because the 
results using TOTFEE and NONAUDFEE are qualitatively similar, we only tabulate the 
results using TOTFEE. As shown in Column (1) of Table 7, similar to LR’s findings, we 
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 Larker and Richardson (2004) further analyze the influence of corporate governance on this 
relationship and contribute to the accounting literature showing that corporate governance plays an   
important role in this relationship. Because we do not have data on the corporate governance, we are not 
able to replicate that part of their analyses. 
31
 For this purpose, we include only the auditors that have at least 10 clients per year. This restriction 
leads to a slight decrease in sample size to 9,135. 
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also document a significantly negative association (-0.3283 and t = -2.95). However, 
when we add control variables, as shown in Column (2), the coefficient on TOTFEE 
becomes insignificant (-0.0842 and t = -0.99). This finding is consistent with that of CK 
who also include several control variables in their regression model.32 Our results in 
Table 7 suggest that the omission (inclusion) of the control variables in LR (CK) causes 
the discrepancy in the regression results between LR and CK.   
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE!] 
To provide further evidence on whether the asymmetry in the |DA|-ABAFEE 
relation between the positive and negative ABAFEE submples still holds even after 
controlling for TOTFEE, we include both TOTFEE and ABAFEE in the regression 
model and re-perform the analyses. As shown in Column (3) of Table 7, the coefficient 
on ABAFEE is not significant in the total (pooled) sample. When we perform the 
analyses with the positive abnormal audit fee observations, as shown in Column (4), the 
coefficient on ABAFEE is positively significant, a finding consistent with that reported 
in Table 6. When we perform the analyses with the negative abnormal fee observations, 
as shown in Column (5), the coefficient on ABAFEE is insignificant with a negative 
sign. In short, our results reported in Table 6 are robust with respect to the inclusion of 
the client importance measures, i.e., TOTFEE, into the regressions.  
  
5. Further analyses on non-audit fees 
When examining the issue of economic dependence of the auditor on the client, 
previous studies focus their attention on the amount, and/or the relative importance of 
NAS fees rather than audit fees. To provide further insight into the issue, we re-estimate 
Eq. (4), using abnormal NAS fees (ABNAFEE), the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees 
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 When we drop insignificant control variables from the regression model, the results do not change. 
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(FEERATIO1) and the ratio of NAS fees to total fees (FEERATIO2) as the dependent 
variable.  
In Section A of Table 8, we report the results of regressions using abnormal 
NAS fees as our test variable. We compute abnormal NAS fees using similar procedures 
used for computing abnormal audit fees: We first predict normal NAS fees by 
estimating Eq. (1) using NAS fees (instead of audit fees) as the dependent variable. We 
then obtain abnormal NAS fees, i.e., ABNAFEE, by subtracting predicted, normal NAS 
fees from log values of actual NAS fees. As shown in Columns (1a) and (2a) of Section 
A, Table 8, the coefficient on ABNAFEE is insignificant with a positive sign for both 
subsamples with ABNAFEE >0 and ABNAFEE < 0.33 These overall insignificant results 
for both subsamples are in line with the finding of several previous studies (e.g., 
Ashbaugh et al 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003).34   
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE!] 
In Section B of Table 8, we report the results of regressions using the ratio of 
NAS fees to audit fees, denoted by FEERATIO1, as our test variable to check whether 
more non-audit fees relative to audit fees impair audit quality. As shown in Columns 
(1b) and (2b), the coefficient on FEERATIO1 is insignificant for both subsamples with 
FEERATIO1 > 1 and FEERATIO1 < 1, which is consistent with those reported in most 
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 If we use the abnormal non-audit fees deflated by the total non-audit fees rather than ABNAFEE, the 
coefficient on the variable is marginally significant (t = 1.65) when the variable is greater than zero but 
insignificant when the variable is smaller than zero. All the other results are similar to those reported in 
Section A of Table 8. 
34
 A possible reason for the insignificant result is that the estimation of normal level of non-audit fee is 
noisier than the estimation of normal audit fees. Unlike the nature of audit service, the nature of non-audit 
service is not homogeneous across different auditors and clients. Thus, the high noise term in the 
estimated abnormal non-audit fees could drive insignificant results in our regression analyses. For 
example, the explanatory power (adjusted R2) of the non-audit fee estimation model is 0.65, which is 
significantly lower than that of audit fee model reported in Table 3 (0.80). Similarly, when Ashbaugh et 
al. (2003) investigate the determinants of various auditor fees by regressing auditors’ fee metrics on a 
group of determinants (Table 2, p. 619), the adjusted R2 of non-audit fee model (0.34) or non-audit fee 
ratio model (0.28) is much lower than that of audit fee model (0.66) or total audit fee model (0.68). 
DeFond et al. (2002) show similar results too.  
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previous studies.35 Following DeFond et al. (2002), when we use an alternative measure, 
abnormal FEERATIO1, which is the residual from Eq. (1) after the dependent variable 
is replaced with FEERATIO1, the results are similar to those reported in Section B of 
the Table 8.  
In Section C of Table 8, we report the results of regressions using, as our test 
variable, FEERATIO2 which is the ratio of non-audit fees to total (the sum of audit and 
non-audit) fees. As shown in Columns (1c) and (2c), the coefficient on FEERATIO2 is 
insignificant for both subsamples with FEERATIO2 > 0.5 and FEERATIO2 < 0.5, which 
is again consistent with those reported in most previous studies 
 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we develop and test the hypothesis that the incentive structure of 
auditors and the associated audit quality differ systematically between the two distinct 
situations, that is when audit fees are in excess of the expected, normal level of fees 
(i.e., abnormal audit fees are positive) and when they are less than the normal level 
(abnormal audit fees are negative). If auditors receive more than the normal level of fees 
from their clients, auditors’ economic bonding to the clients is non-trivial, creating 
incentives for auditors to compromise their audit quality. However, if auditors receive 
less than a normal level of fees, auditors have few (or relatively weak) incentives to 
compromise audit quality.  
To address the above two predictions, we first decompose actual audit fees into 
two components, namely normal audit fees and abnormal audit fees, and then estimate 
various regressions of discretionary accruals on abnormal audit fees and other control 
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 When the median value (0.613) of FEERATIO1, rather than 1, is used to split the sample, the results are 
also consistent - the coefficient on FEERATIO1 is 0.0014 (t = 1.33) for the subsample higher than the 
median and 0.0153 (t = 1.01) for the subsample lower than median. 
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variables, separately, for the full sample, the subsample with positive abnormal audit 
fees, and the subsample with negative abnormal audit fees. The results of various 
regressions using a sample of 9,820 firm-year observations over the 2000-2003 period 
support these predictions and the results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.  
Our study provides useful insight into current regulatory debates on economic 
dependence of the auditor on the client, and help us better understand reasons why 
previous research provides mixed evidence on the association between various fee 
metrics and opportunistic earnings management. If the association between abnormal 
fees and unsigned discretionary accruals is conditional on the sign of abnormal fees, 
examining the association for a combined sample of clients with both positive and 
negative abnormal fees most likely leads us to observe insignificant associations as 
reported in most previous studies (e.g., Antle et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung 
and Kallapur 2003) as well as in our study. This is so because the two opposing effects 
may cancel out each other when the combined sample is used. The findings of this study 
suggest that future research on similar issues should take into account the fact that 
auditors’ incentives to compromise their audit quality differ systematically, depending 
on whether audit fees are greater or less than auditors’ expectation on the normal fee 
level.              
Like many other studies, this study has several limitations: First, we use the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals as a proxy for opportunistic earnings management. 
It is now well known that discretionary accrual measures are noisy. In an attempt to 
alleviate concerns over this problem, we use two advanced approaches to measure 
discretionary accruals, one suggested by Ball and Shivarkumar (2006) and the other 
suggested by Kothari et al. (2005).  Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the possibility that 
our results are driven by measurement errors involved in our discretionary accrual 
 36 
measures. Finally, we examine the issue of audit quality in the context of earnings 
management as audit quality is unobservable and thus difficult to measure. An 
alternative way to evaluate this issue is to replicate the main thrust of our study, namely 
the finding of the asymmetry in the fee-quality association between clients with positive 
and negative abnormal fees in different contexts, such as the propensity of auditors 
issuing going concern opinions. Further research in this direction is called for. 
 
 37 
References 
Antle R., E. A. Gordon, G. Narayanamoorthy and L. Zhou, 2002. The Joint determination of 
audit fees, non-audit fees and abnormal accruals. Working Paper, Yale University  
 
Ashbaugh, H., R. LaFond, and B. Mayhew, 2003. Do non-audit services compromise auditor 
independence? Further evidence. The Accounting Review 78 (3): 611-639.  
 
Ball, R. and L. Shivakumar. 2006. The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss 
recognition. Working Paper. University of Chicago. 
 
Becker, C., DeFond, M., Jiambalvo, J., and K. Subramanyam, 1998. The effect of audit quality 
on earnings management, Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (1): 1-24.  
 
Beck, P. J., T. J. Frecka, and I. Solomon. 1988. An empirical analysis of the relationship 
between MAS involvement and auditor tenure: Implications for auditor independence. Journal 
of Accounting Literature 7: 65-84.  
 
Butler, M. A. J. Leone, and M. Willenborg. 2004. An empirical analysis of auditor reporting and 
its association with abnormal accruals.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 32 (2): 139-165. 
 
Chaney, P., D. C. Jeter, and L. Shivakumar. 2004. Self-selection of auditors and audit pricing in 
private firms. The Accounting Review 79 (1): 51-72. 
 
Choi, J. –H., J. -B. Kim, X. Liu, and D. A. Simunic. 2005. Audit pricing, legal liability regimes, 
and Big 4 premiums: Theory and cross-country evidence. Working Paper, University of British 
Columbia. 
 
Choi, J.-H., and T.J. Wong. 2006. Auditors’ governance functions and legal environments: An 
international investigation. Contemporary Accounting Research (forthcoming).  
 
Chung, H. and S. Kallapur. 2003. Client importance, non-audit services, and abnormal accruals. 
The Accounting Review 78 (4): 931-955.  
 
Craswell, A., J.R. Francis, and S. Taylor. 1995. Auditor brand name reputations and industry 
specialization. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20 (3): 297-322. 
 
 38 
Craswell, A., D. J. Stokes, and J. Laughton, 2002. Auditor independence and fee dependence. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2): 253-275.  
 
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981a. Auditor independence, “low balling,” and disclosure regulation. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 (2): 113-127. 
 
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981b. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 
(3): 183-199. 
 
DeChow, P. M. and I. D. Dichev. 2002. The quality accruals and earnings: The role of accrual 
estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 35-59. 
 
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The 
Accounting Review 70 (2): 193-225. 
 
DeFond, M., and J. Jiambalvo, 1994. Debt covenant violations and manipulations of accruals. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1-2): 145-176.  
 
DeFond, M., K. Raghunandan, and K. Subramanyam, 2002. Do non-audit services fees impair 
auditor independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions. Journal of Accounting 
Research 40 (4): 1247-1274.  
 
Dye, R. A. 1991. Infomationally motivated auditor replacement. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 14 (4): 347-374. 
 
Fan, J. and T. J. Wong. 2005. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in 
emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (1): 35-72.  
 
Francis, J., E, Maydew, and H. C. Sparks. 1999. The role of big six auditors in the credible 
reporting of accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 18 (2): 17-34. 
 
Francis, J., and D. J. Stokes. 1986. Audit prices, product differentiation, and scale economies: 
further evidence from the Australian market. Journal of Accounting Research 24 (2): 383-393. 
 
Frankel, R., M. Johnson, and K. Nelson, 2002. The relation between auditors' fees for non-audit 
services and earnings quality. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 71-105.  
 
 39 
Jones, J., 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting 
Research 29 (1): 193-228. 
 
Kasznik, R. 1999. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. 
Journal of Accounting Research 37 (1):  57-81. 
 
Kim, J.-B., R. Chung, and M. Firth. 2003. Auditor conservatism, asymmetric monitoring and 
earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 20: 323-360. 
 
Kim, K.-T., S. Kwok, and L.-S. Hwang. 2005. Abnormal non-audit fees and income 
management. Working Paper. Seoul National University. 
 
Kinney, W.R. Jr., and R. Libby. 2002. Discussion of the relation between auditors’ fees for non-
audit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 107-114. 
 
Kinney, W. R. Jr., Z. Palmrose, and S. Scholz. 2004. Auditor independence, non-audit services 
and earnings restatements: Was the U.S. government right? Journal of Accounting Research 42 
(3): 561-588. 
 
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (1): 163-197. 
 
Larcker, D. F., and S. A. Richardson. 2004. Fees paid to audit firms, accrual choices, and 
corporate governance. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3): 625-658. 
 
Magee, R., and M. Tseng. 1990. Audit pricing and independence. The Accounting Review 65 
(2): 315-336. 
 
Raghunandan, K., J. Read. and S. Whisenant. 2003. Initial evidence on the association between 
nonaudit fees and restated financial statements. Accounting Horizon 17 (3): 223-234. 
 
Reynolds, J.L., D. Deis, and J.R. Francis. 2004. Professional service fees and auditor 
objectivity. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 23 (1): 29-52. 
 
Ruddock, C., S. Taylor, and S. Taylor. 2005. Non-audit services and earnings conservatism: Is 
auditor independence Impaired? Forthcoming at Contemporary Accounting Research. 
 
 40 
Sankaraguruswamy, S., and S. Whisenant. 2003. Pricing initial audit engagements: Empirical 
evidence following public disclosure of audit fees. Working paper. University of Houston. 
 
Simunic, D. 1980. The pricing of audit services: theory and evidence. Journal of Accounting 
Research 18 (1): 161-190. 
 
Simunic, D. A. and M. T. Stein.  1996. The impact of litigation risk on audit pricing: a review of 
the economics and the evidence. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 15 (Supplement): 
119-133. 
 
White, H. 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for 
heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48 (4): 817-838. 
 
Zmijewski, M. E. 1984. Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial distress 
perdiction models. Journal of Accounting Research 22 (Supplement): 59-82. 
 
 
 41 
Figure 1 
The distribution of the magnitude of discretionary accruals 
categorized by the magnitude of abnormal audit fees 
 
Panel A: Distribution of DA1  
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Panel B: Distribution of DA2  
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Table 1 
Distributions of variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1% 50% 99% 
DA 1 0.1223 0.2852 0.0005 0.0538 1.0120 
DA 2 0.1630 0.2779 0.0015 0.0872 1.2171 
AFEE 5.6243 1.1539 3.2923 5.4848 8.8818 
LNTA 12.2316 2.0403 7.6967 12.2065 17.0875 
NBS 0.9924 0.4611 0 0.6931 2.0794 
NGS 0.9778 0.6216 0 1.0986 2.3026 
INVREC 0.2771 0.1905 0 0.2522 0.7863 
EMPLOY 55.9163 70.9413 2.8284 30.9677 352.1363 
ISSUE 0.4269 0.4946 0 0 1 
FOREIGN 0.4549 0.4980 0 0 1 
EXORD 0.2147 0.4106 0 0 1 
LOSS 0.4413 0.4966 0 0 1 
LEVE 0.4817 0.3128 0.0416 0.4453 1.8538 
ROA -0.0940 0.3901 -1.5136 0.0174 0.3017 
LIQUID 3.5525 10.2021 0.2666 2.1699 22.3860 
BIG4 0.8646 0.3421 0 1 1 
BTM 0.7000 0.7292 0 0.4814 4 
CHGSALE 0.0714 0.6072 -0.9172 0.0391 1.4817 
AUDCHG 0.1019 0.3025 0 0 1 
CFO -0.0087 0.1018 -0.2709 -0.0007 0.1988 
LAGACCR -0.0108 0.1354 -0.3005 -0.0015 0.2055 
Definitions of Variables 
DA         = discretionary accruals, DA1 is the discretionary accruals measured  by Ball and Shivakumar’s  
                         (2006) method; DA2 is the discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones model and  
         adjusted for firm-performance (Kothari et al. 2005);  
AFEE           = natural log of audit fees;  
LNTA           = log value of total assets;  
NBS              = log value of one plus number of business segments; 
NGS             = log value of one plus number of geographic segments; 
INVREC       = inventory and receivables divided by total assets;  
EMPLOY      = square root of the number of employees; 
ISSUE           = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the total assets,  
                         0 otherwise; 
FOREIGN     = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, 0 otherwise; 
EXORD         = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses, 0 otherwise; 
LOSS            = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
LEVE            = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets); 
ROA              = return on assets; 
LIQUID        = current assets divided by current liabilities; 
BIG4             = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 or predecessor auditor, 0 otherwise; 
BTM         = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
CHGSALE    = sales change from the prior year to current year scaled by lagged total assets; 
AUDCHG     = 1 if auditor is in the first year of audit engagement, 0 otherwise; 
CFO         = cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total assets; 
LAGACCR    = prior-year total accruals scaled by lagged total assets.  
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Table 2 
Estimation of normal audit fees 
 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t value) 
LNTA + 0.3887 (70.74***) 
NBS + 0.1260 (9.56***) 
NGS + 0.1472 (13.69***) 
INVREC + 0.3449 (10.40***) 
EMPLOY + 0.0020 (11.85***) 
ISSUE + 0.0271 (2.42**) 
FOREIGN + 0.2351 (16.65***) 
EXORD + 0.1507 (10.87***) 
LOSS + 0.1155 (8.04***) 
LEVE + 0.3225 (14.61***) 
ROA - -0.2184 (-8.00***) 
LIQUID - -0.0029 (-1.68*) 
BIG4 + 0.1787 (10.08***) 
BTM - -0.0197 (-2.57***) 
Constant 
 
? 0.2607 (4.26***) 
Industry & Year Dummies  Included 
N  9,820 
Adjusted R2  0.7983 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White’s (1980) consistent standard error estimates to correct 
for heteroskedasticity.  *, **, *** denotes p-value <10%, p-value<5%, p-value<1%, respectively with two-
tailed tests. See Table 1 for the definitions of variables.  
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Definitions of Variables 
AFEE           = natural log of audit fees;  
LNTA           = log value of total assets;  
NBS              = log value of one plus number of business segments; 
NGS             = log value of one plus number of geographic segments; 
INVREC       = inventory and receivables divided by total assets;  
EMPLOY      = square root of the number of employees; 
ISSUE           = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the total assets,  
                         0 otherwise; 
FOREIGN     = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, 0 otherwise; 
EXORD         = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses, 0 otherwise; 
LOSS            = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
LEVE            = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets); 
ROA              = return on assets; 
LIQUID        = current assets divided by current liabilities; 
BIG4             = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 or predecessor auditor, 0 otherwise; 
BTM         = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
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Table 3 
Distributions of abnormal audit fees  
 
Variable ABAFEE ABAFEE>0 ABAFEE<0 
Mean -0.0071 0.3861 -0.3939 
Std. Dev. 0.4999 0.2810 0.3410 
1% -1.1908 0.0071 -0.0049 
25% -0.3225 0.1545 -0.1529 
Median -0.0042 0.3315 -0.3185 
75% 0.3284 0.5679 -0.5539 
99% 1.0000 1.0000 -1.3257 
N 9,820 4,870 4,950 
 47
Table 4: Pearson correlation among regression variables 
 
 DA 1 DA 2 ABAFEE LNTA BIG4 BTM CHGSALE LOSS LEVE ISSUE AUDCHG CFO 
DA 2 0.5847 
(<0.001) 
 
           
ABAFEE -0.0019 
(0.8498) 
 
0.0082 
(0.4177) 
          
LNTA -0.1820 
(<0.001) 
-0.2164 
(<0.001) 
0.0002 
(0.9869) 
 
         
BIG4 -0.0766 
(<0.001) 
-0.0957 
(<0.001) 
0.0017 
(0.8656) 
 
0.4314 
(<0.001) 
        
BTM -0.0626 
(<0.001) 
-0.0878 
(<0.001) 
0.0003 
(0.9757) 
 
-0.0805 
(<0.001) 
-0.0834 
(<0.001) 
       
CHGSALE 0.0271 
(0.0072) 
0.0209 
(0.0385) 
-0.0147 
(0.1458) 
 
0.0528 
(<0.001) 
0.0128 
(0.2033) 
-0.1229 
(<0.001) 
      
LOSS 0.1634 
(<0.001) 
0.1766 
(<0.001) 
-0.0022 
(0.8251) 
 
-0.3290 
(<0.001) 
-0.0853 
(<0.001) 
0.1143 
(<0.001) 
-0.1330 
(<0.001) 
     
LEVE 0.0270 
(0.0075) 
0.0467 
(<0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.9753) 
 
0.0893 
(<0.001) 
-0.0771 
(<0.001) 
-0.1231 
(<0.001) 
-0.0532 
(<0.001) 
0.0569 
(<0.001) 
    
ISSUE 0.0865 
(<0.001) 
0.1045 
(<0.001) 
-0.0026 
(0.7977) 
 
0.0128 
(0.2048) 
-0.0045 
(0.6532) 
-0.1403 
(<0.001) 
0.1036 
(<0.001) 
0.0738 
(<0.001) 
0.1846 
(<0.001) 
   
AUDCHG 0.0190 
(0.0593) 
0.0082 
(0.4172) 
-0.0513 
(<0.001) 
 
-0.0948 
(<0.001) 
-0.1306 
(<0.001) 
0.0347 
(0.0006) 
-0.0421 
(<0.001) 
0.0383 
(0.001) 
0.0585 
(<0.001) 
-0.0122 
(0.2251) 
  
CFO -0.3091 
(<0.001) 
-0.4138 
(<0.001) 
-0.0112 
(0.2676) 
 
0.3388 
(<0.001) 
0.1016 
(<0.001) 
0.0543 
(<0.001) 
0.0505 
(<0.001) 
-0.4350 
(<0.001) 
-0.0604 
(<0.001) 
-0.1879 
(<0.001) 
-0.0271 
(0.0073) 
 
LAGACCR -0.1115 
(<0.001) 
-0.1224 
(<0.001) 
-0.0168 
(0.0965) 
 
0.0439 
(<0.001) 
0.0091 
(0.3678) 
0.0213 
(0.0350) 
-0.0162 
(0.1082) 
-0.0923 
(<0.001) 
-0.0246 
(0.0149) 
-0.0276 
(0.0062) 
-0.0030 
(0.7650) 
0.0784 
(<0.001) 
 
Two-tailed p values are presented in the parentheses. See Table 1 for the definitions of variables. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Definitions of Variables 
DA         = discretionary accruals, DA1 is the discretionary accruals measured  by Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) method; DA2 is the discretionary accruals measured by modified  
Jones model and adjusted for firm-performance (Kothari et al. 2005);  
ABAFEE       = abnormal audit fees;  
LNTA           = log value of total assets;  
BIG4             = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 or predecessor auditor, 0 otherwise; 
BTM         = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
CHGSALE    = sales change from the prior year to current year scaled by lagged total assets; 
LOSS            = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
LEVE            = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets); 
ISSUE           = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the total assets, 0 otherwise; 
AUDCHG     = 1 if auditor is in the first year of audit engagement, 0 otherwise; 
CFO         = cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total assets; 
LAGACCR    = prior-year total accruals scaled by lagged total assets.
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Table 5 
Full sample results on the association of unsigned discretionary accruals with abnormal 
audit fees, audit fees, and absolute abnormal audit fees  
Section A 
Using |DA1| as the dependent variable 
Section B 
Using |DA2| as the dependent variable 
 
Variable 
 
Pred. 
sign 
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b) 
ABAFEE ? -0.0030 
(-0.35) 
 
  0.0019 
(0.35) 
  
AFEE ?  0.0054 
(0.77) 
  0.0052 
(1.01) 
 
 
|ABAFEE| ?   0.0365 
(2.60***) 
 
  0.0232 
(2.70***) 
LNTA - -0.0106 
(-4.76***) 
 
-0.0132 
(-2.60***) 
-0.0112 
(-5.36***) 
-0.0110 
(-4.71***) 
-0.0135 
(-3.42***) 
-0.0114 
(-4.82***) 
BIG4 - -0.0237 
(-3.06***) 
 
-0.0244 
(-3.22***) 
-0.0221 
(-2.88***) 
-0.0302 
(-3.61***) 
-0.0293 
(-3.53***) 
-0.0277 
(-3.33***) 
BTM - -0.0154 
(-3.88***) 
 
-0.0153 
(-3.87***) 
-0.0150 
(-3.77***) 
-0.0214 
(-4.72***) 
-0.0208 
(-4.62***) 
-0.0206 
(-4.60***) 
CHGSALE + 0.0131 
(0.41) 
 
0.0133 
(0.41) 
0.0132 
(0.41) 
0.0121 
(0.33) 
0.0114 
(0.31) 
0.0113 
(0.31) 
LOSS + 0.0030 
(0.33) 
 
0.0025 
(0.26) 
0.0023 
(0.25) 
-0.0206 
(-1.65*) 
-0.0214 
(-1.73*) 
-0.0214 
(-1.71*) 
LEVE + 0.0187 
(1.8) 
 
0.0158 
(1.26) 
0.0176 
(1.28) 
0.0264 
(1.91*) 
0.0251 
(1.85*) 
0.0272 
(1.97**) 
ISSUE + 0.0118 
(1.73*) 
 
0.0118 
(1.73*) 
0.0112 
(1.65*) 
0.0093 
(1.26) 
0.0088 
(1.20) 
0.0085 
(1.16) 
AUDCHG + 0.0060 
(0.42) 
 
0.0067 
(0.46) 
0.0044 
(0.31) 
-0.0095 
(-1.09) 
-0.0093 
(-1.07) 
-0.0109 
(-1.26) 
CFO - -0.2294 
(-6.52***) 
 
-0.2285 
(-6.46***) 
-0.2280 
(-6.50***) 
-0.3361 
(-5.81***) 
-0.3340 
(-5.72***) 
-0.3339 
(-5.73***) 
LAGACCR - -0.0289 
(-2.28**) 
 
-0.0288 
(-2.28**) 
-0.0288 
(-2.28**) 
-0.0539 
(-2.34**) 
-0.0280 
(-1.87*) 
-0.0280 
(-1.87*) 
Constant 
 
? 0.2933 
(11.20***) 
 
0.2949 
(10.79***) 
0.2859 
(10.35***) 
0.3643 
(13.95***) 
0.3640 
(13.86***) 
0.3577 
(13.95***) 
Industry 
&Year  
Dummies 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  9,820 
 
9,820 9,820 9,820 9,820 9,820 
Adjusted R2  0.1378 
 
0.1358 0.1394 0.2142 0.2143 0.2167 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White’s (1980) consistent standard error estimates to correct 
for heteroskedasticity.  *, **, *** denotes p-value <10%, p-value<5%, p-value<1%, respectively with two-
tailed tests. See Table 1 for the definitions of variables. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Definitions of Variables 
DA         = discretionary accruals, DA1 is the discretionary accruals measured  by Ball and Shivakumar’s  
(2006) method; DA2 is the discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones model and  
adjusted for firm-performance (Kothari et al. 2005);  
ABAFEE       = abnormal audit fees;  
AFEE            = natural log of audit fees; 
LNTA           = log value of total assets;  
BIG4             = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 or predecessor auditor, 0 otherwise; 
BTM         = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
CHGSALE    = sales change from the prior year to current year scaled by lagged total assets; 
LOSS            = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
LEVE            = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets); 
ISSUE           = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the total assets,  
0 otherwise; 
AUDCHG     = 1 if auditor is in the first year of audit engagement, 0 otherwise; 
CFO         = cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total assets; 
LAGACCR    = prior-year total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Table 6 
Subsample results on the association between discretionary accruals and abnormal audit fees 
 
 Section A 
Using |DA1| as the dependent variable 
Section B 
Using |DA2| as the dependent variable 
Sample (1a) 
ABAFEE
R
R R
R
 0 
(2a) 
ABAFEE
ST
ST ST
ST
 
(3a) 
ABAFEE
R
R R
R
 0 & 
U
U U
U
DA 1+
U
U U
U
 
(4a) 
ABAFEE
R T V
R T VR T V
R T V
U
U U
U
DA 1-
U
U U
U
 
(1b) 
ABAFEE
R
R R
R
 0 
(2b) 
ABAFEE
S T
S T S T
S T
 
(3b) 
ABAFEE
R
R R
R
 0 & 
U
U U
U
DA 2+
U
U U
U
 
(4b) 
ABAFEE
RT V
RT VRT V
RT V
U
U U
U
DA 2-
U
U U
U
 
ABAFEE 0.0384 
(3.34***) 
 
-0.0331 
(-1.57) 
0.0493 
(2.99***) 
 
0.0248 
(2.42**) 
0.0338 
(2.41**) 
-0.0140 
(-1.35) 
0.0248 
(1.73*) 
0.0474 
(2.63***) 
LNTA -0.0142 
(-6.84***) 
 
-0.0079 
(-2.06**) 
-0.0189 
(-8.11***) 
 
-0.0105 
(-5.88***) 
-0.0139 
(-3.90***) 
-0.0088 
(-2.66***) 
-0.0138 
(-2.88***) 
-0.0179 
(-5.92***) 
BIG4 -0.0175 
(-1.79*) 
 
-0.0312 
(-2.48**) 
-0.0123 
(-0.98) 
 
-0.0179 
(-1.54) 
-0.0234 
(-1.92*) 
-0.0349 
(-2.98***) 
-0.0371 
(-2.47**) 
-0.0092 
(-0.45) 
BTM -0.0151 
(-2.50**) 
 
-0.0177 
(-3.73***) 
-0.0044 
(-0.77) 
 
-0.0168 
(-3.72***) 
-0.0214 
(-3.24***) 
-0.0223 
(-4.13***) 
-0.00002 
(-0.00) 
-0.0356 
(-3.98***) 
CHGSALE -0.0247 
(-0.50) 
 
0.0397 
(1.24) 
0.0406 
(2.21**) 
 
-0.0027 
(-0.13) 
-0.0320 
(-0.58) 
0.0406 
(1.11) 
0.0275 
(1.13) 
-0.0795 
(-1.00) 
LOSS -0.0161 
(-1.30) 
 
0.0225 
(1.71*) 
-0.0951 
(-5.48***) 
 
0.0666 
(8.03***) 
-0.0308 
(-1.36) 
-0.0093 
(-0.65) 
-0.0978 
(-3.59***) 
0.0556 
(3.74***) 
LEVE 0.0257 
(1.49) 
 
0.0129 
(0.66) 
0.0560 
(2.98***) 
 
0.0111 
(0.74) 
0.0398 
(1.94*) 
0.0174 
(1.01) 
0.0518 
(2.18**) 
0.0199 
(0.65) 
ISSUE 0.0135 
(1.55) 
 
0.0095 
(0.93) 
0.0073 
(0.87) 
 
0.0094 
(1.45) 
0.0128 
(1.06) 
0.0060 
(0.66) 
-0.0059 
(-0.42) 
0.0332 
(2.51**) 
AUDCHG -0.0016 
(-0.10) 
 
0.0122 
(0.54) 
-0.0262 
(-2.44**) 
 
0.0064 
(0.53) 
-0.0178 
(-1.23) 
-0.0039 
(-0.36) 
-0.0393 
(-2.33**) 
0.0026 
(0.11) 
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Table 7 
Replication of Larker and Richardson’s study with |DA1| 
 
Sample 
partitioning 
(1) 
Total Sample 
(2) 
Total Sample 
(3) 
Total Sample 
(4) 
ABAFEE W
W W
W  0 
(5) 
ABAFEE XZY
X YX Y
X Y  
TOTFEE -0.3283 
(-2.95***) 
 
-0.0842 
(-0.99) 
-0.0736 
(-0.96) 
-0.1094 
(-0.79) 
-0.0564 
(-0.57) 
ABAFEE   -0.0026 
(-0.30) 
 
0.0367 
(3.16***) 
-0.0335 
(-1.53) 
LNTA  -0.0086 
(-3.48***) 
-0.0087 
(-3.58***) 
 
-0.0136 
(-6.09***) 
-0.0043 
(-0.99) 
BIG4  -0.0233 
(-2.47**) 
-0.0234 
(-2.47**) 
 
-0.0189 
(-1.55) 
-0.0275 
(-1.83*) 
BTM  -0.0146 
(-3.44***) 
-0.0146 
(-3.44***) 
 
-0.0151 
(-2.44**) 
-0.0159 
(-3.04***) 
CHGSALE  0.0088 
(0.25) 
0.0088 
(0.25) 
 
-0.0296 
(-0.58) 
0.0370 
(1.04) 
LOSS  0.0117 
(1.23) 
0.0116 
(1.23) 
 
-0.0095 
(-0.74) 
0.0332 
(2.37**) 
LEVE  -0.0011 
(-0.08) 
-0.0010 
(-0.07) 
 
0.0198 
(1.15) 
-0.0179 
(-0.86) 
ISSUE  0.0127 
(1.80*) 
0.0127 
(1.80*) 
 
0.0139 
(1.57) 
0.0107 
(1.01) 
AUDCHG  0.0064 
(0.39) 
0.0061 
(0.38) 
 
-0.0031 
(-0.18) 
0.0141 
(0.55) 
CFO  -0.2234 
(-5.64***) 
-0.2235 
(-5.62***) 
 
-0.2049 
(-3.70***) 
-0.2319 
(-3.84***) 
LAGACCR  -0.0280 
(-2.18**) 
-0.0280 
(-2.18**) 
 
-0.0179 
(-1.89*) 
-0.0379 
(-1.55) 
Constant 
 
0.1178 
(38.56***) 
0.2723 
(9.34***) 
0.2728 
(9.64***) 
 
0.3236 
(11.06***) 
0.1963 
(3.71***) 
Year & 
Industry 
Dummies 
Included Included Included Included Included 
N 9,135 9,135 9,135 
 
4,608 4,527 
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.1245 0.1245 
 
0.1712 0.1172 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White’s (1980) consistent standard error estimates to correct 
for heteroskedasticity.  *, **, *** denotes p-value <10%, p-value<5%, p-value<1%, respectively with two-
tailed tests. TOTFEE = a proxy for the client importance measured by the ratio of total fee paid to an auditor by 
a client to total revenue of the year that the auditor receives. See Table 1 for the definitions of variables. 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Definitions of Variables 
DA         = discretionary accruals, DA1 is the discretionary accruals measured  by Ball and Shivakumar’s  
(2006) method; DA2 is the discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones model and  
adjusted for firm-performance (Kothari et al. 2005);  
TOTFEE       = total fee that a client pay to an auditor divided by total revenue of the auditor in that year; 
ABAFEE       = abnormal audit fees;  
LNTA           = log value of total assets;  
BIG4             = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 or predecessor auditor, 0 otherwise; 
BTM         = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
CHGSALE    = sales change from the prior year to current year scaled by lagged total assets; 
LOSS            = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
LEVE            = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets); 
ISSUE           = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the total assets,  
0 otherwise; 
AUDCHG     = 1 if auditor is in the first year of audit engagement, 0 otherwise; 
CFO         = cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total assets; 
LAGACCR    = prior-year total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. 
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Table 8 
Results of regressions of |DA1| on abnormal non-audit fees and fee ratios  
 
 []\^+_a` bced
[ \ ^ _ ` b c d[ \ ^ _ ` b c d
[ \ ^ _ ` b c d []\f^g_h` bfcei
[ \ ^ _ ` b c i[ \ ^ _ ` b c i
[ \ ^ _ ` b c i
 
[j\f^g_h` bfcek
[ \ ^ _ ` b c k[ \ ^ _ ` b c k
[ \ ^ _ ` b c k
 
Sample 
partitioning 
(1a) 
ABNAFEE>0 
(2a) 
ABNAFEE<0 
(1b) 
FEERATIO1 
>1 
(2b) 
FEERATIO1 
<1 
(1c) 
FEERATIO2 
>0.5 
(2c) 
FEERATIO2 
<0.5 
ABNAFEE 0.0103 
(1.46) 
 
0.0010 
(0.39) 
    
FEERATIO1   0.0004 
(0.42) 
 
0.0139 
(1.54) 
  
FEERATIO2     0.0620 
(1.03) 
0.0222 
(1.30) 
 
LNTA -0.0097 
(-2.87***) 
-0.0115 
(-4.39***) 
-0.0055 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.0165 
(-10.55***) 
-0.0068 
(-1.18) 
-0.0164 
(-10.41***) 
BIG4 -0.0196 
(-1.72*) 
-0.0281 
(-3.00***) 
-0.0138 
(-0.54) 
 
-0.0247 
(-3.23***) 
-0.0156 
(-0.60) 
-0.0257 
(-3.35***) 
BTM -0.0203 
(-3.54***) 
-0.0093 
(-2.53**) 
-0.0174 
(-2.04**) 
 
-0.0174 
(-4.27***) 
-0.0172 
(-1.99**) 
-0.0182 
(-4.41***) 
CHGSALE 0.0061 
(0.14) 
0.0275 
(2.33**) 
0.0574 
(1.54) 
 
-0.0289 
(-0.78) 
0.0575 
(1.55) 
-0.0282 
(-0.76) 
LOSS 0.0166 
(1.22) 
-0.0130 
(-1.43) 
0.0337 
(1.59) 
 
-0.0149 
(-1.82*) 
0.0334 
(1.59) 
-0.0130 
(-1.57) 
LEVE -0.0146 
(-0.73) 
0.0637 
(4.39***) 
-0.0561 
(-1.80*) 
 
0.0526 
(4.25***) 
-0.0562 
(-1.80*) 
0.0554 
(4.50***) 
ISSUE 0.0212 
(2.12**) 
-0.0016 
(-0.20) 
0.0140 
(0.94) 
 
0.0127 
(2.06**) 
0.0138 
(0.93) 
0.0129 
(2.10**) 
AUDCHG 0.0219 
(0.74) 
-0.0040 
(-0.50) 
0.0553 
(0.87) 
 
-0.0063 
(-0.88) 
0.0565 
(0.89) 
-0.0062 
(-0.87) 
CFO -0.2249 
(-5.28***) 
-0.2248 
(-3.74***) 
-0.3312 
(-3.64***) 
 
-0.1736 
(-7.04***) 
-0.3316 
(-3.63***) 
-0.1793 
(-7.20***) 
LAGACCR -0.0266 
(-1.93*) 
-0.0372 
(-3.07***) 
-0.0231 
(-1.75*) 
 
-0.0455 
(-3.63***) 
-0.0540 
(-2.29**) 
-0.0179 
(-0.66) 
Constant 
 
0.2929 
(7.53***) 
0.2799 
(9.34***) 
0.2436 
(3.39***) 
 
0.3426 
(15.29***) 
0.2223 
(2.57***) 
0.3464 
(15.28***) 
Year & 
Industry 
Dummies 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 5,593 4,227 3,271 
 
6,549 3,259 6,549 
Adjusted R2 0.1255 0.2088 0.1359 
 
0.2047 0.1346 0.1985 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White’s (1980) consistent standard error estimates to correct 
for heteroskedasticity.  *, **, *** denotes p-value <10%, p-value<5%, p-value<1%, respectively with two-
tailed tests. ABNAFEE = abnormal non-audit fees. FEERATIO1 = non-audit fees / audit fees. FEERATIO2 = 
non-audit fees / total fees. See Table 1 for the definitions of other variables. 
 
Definitions of Variables 
DA         = discretionary accruals, DA1 is the discretionary accruals measured  by Ball and Shivakumar’s  
(2006) method; DA2 is the discretionary accruals measured by modified Jones model and  
adjusted for firm-performance (Kothari et al. 2005);  
ABNAFEE    = abnormal non-audit fees;  
FEERATIO1 = non-audit fee divided by audit fees; 
FEERATIO2 = non-audit fee divided by total fees; 
LNTA           = log value of total assets;  
BIG4             = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 or predecessor auditor, 0 otherwise; 
BTM         = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
CHGSALE    = sales change from the prior year to current year scaled by lagged total assets; 
LOSS            = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
LEVE            = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets); 
ISSUE           = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the total assets,  
0 otherwise; 
AUDCHG     = 1 if auditor is in the first year of audit engagement, 0 otherwise; 
CFO         = cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total assets; 
LAGACCR    = prior-year total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
 
 
